Lit Review: Syria & External Powers
A Written Report on Four Works About the Relationships Between Syria and Other Regional and Global Powers
The following is an essay reviewing several works about the MENA region I wrote for a Political Science class on the MENA region I took at Duke University in 2020.
THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR & EXTERNAL POWERS: WRITTEN REPORT
The Middle East has long been a zone for world powers to engage in rivalries and conquest, with incredible collateral damage inflicted on the peoples and structures these battles take place in. For a time, it was the great powers of Europe that saw fit to meddle in the Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA), but times have changed. For approximately the past half century, the impetus has shifted to two of the world’s pre-eminent superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. After World War II, the United States made various attempts at influencing the region, from FDR’s meetings with the Saudi King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud to the 1953 CIA-led overthrow of Iran’s Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh. For much of the latter half of the 20th century, the Middle East served as one of the many battlegrounds for the Cold War, with both the United States and the Soviet Union backing favorable regimes and supporting those players antagonistic to their enemies. This ideological tension between these two world powers has surely diminished, but not been entirely extinguished; neither has their use of the Middle East nations and entities to serve as pawns in their global chess game. One of the most recent and significant theaters in this ongoing conflict has been in Syria. Thanks to the collapse of Assad’s government and its subsequent struggles against opposition in the forces, the country has been torn apart, leaving many potential inroads for powers of various types and abilities. The four readings assigned attempt in part to explain some of the various external players in the Syrian conflict and the potential implications of their actions and objectives on Syria, the Middle East, and the global order. Three main powers will be focused on, with special attention paid to the first: Russia, Iran, and Turkey. My examination of the readings will take part in sections; I will first summarize a reading before providing critiques of some of the main points. I will begin by examining the historic role of the Soviet Union in MENA to provide a contextual framework for the following pieces. Then I will provide a more specific and relevant picture of Russia’s objectives in the Middle East over the last decade or so, before examining how these practical and ideological goals realize themselves in the development of Russia’s relationship with Iran that has been playing out in Syria. Finally, I will conclude by examining Turkey’s role in Syria and the potential implications this could have on the fate of Daesh (ISIS).
The first reading for today, Russia Enters the Middle East by Walter Laquer, was published in 1969 and reads exactly like a product of it’s cold-war origins. The main purpose of the article is to provide an examination of the reasoning behind and ways in which the Soviet Union is acting in the Middle East, and it does so through five sections. The first section offers a sort of introduction to the topic by explaining the reasoning for the Soviet Union’s incursion into the Middle East: “From the Soviet point of view the Middle East is a vacuum and seems the least risky area in the world in which to expand the Soviet sphere of influence” (Laquer 1). The second section deals with the level of permeation and support of the Communist party and ideology in the Middle East, which to put it bluntly, was essentially nonexistent. Due to this limited support, Moscow decided not to focus on implementation of ideology and rather took a different approach: “Soviet leaders...can no longer take the loyalty of many communist parties for granted, whereas client states, such as Syria and Egypt, have given them full support” (Laquer 2). The third section examines the Soviet Union’s relationship with Egypt as a case study of this approach: due to Egypt’s military and economic inferiority and conflicts with Israel, they had become increasingly reliant on the Soviet Union, especially for armaments. This essentially made Egypt into the Soviet Union’s first and foremost client state in the region. Section 4 examines the various relationships the Soviet Union had and was pursuing with nation states in the region. Egypt was the principal recipient of Soviet aid and thus one of the Soviet Union’s most promising relationships in the region (Laquer 4). Syria’s ruling Neo-Ba’ath party’s ideological affinity made it the nation “closest to [Moscow’s] heart of any in the Middle East” (Laquer 4). The Soviet Union was also actively pursuing relationships with Iran, Turkey, Yemen, South (Saudi) Arabia, and even Israel for varied reasons. Section 5 discusses the potential implications of these relationships, which can be best summarized with the following quote: “The real importance of the Middle East is limited...But the domination of the Middle East by the Soviet Union would profoundly affect the global balance of power...the whole area will be one of the main zones of conflict in these years of growing turbulence in world politics” (Laquer 7).
My main critique of this article is the importance it affords to the role of the Soviet Union in determining future developments in the Middle East. For example, Laquer states that “The future of the Middle East largely depends on the direction taken by Soviet policy” (6). The author appears to have greatly underestimated the United State’s willingness to engage in the region, as United States policy arguably influenced regional developments to a much greater extent, especially in the past two decades.
The second reading, Conflicted aims, limited means: Russia in the Middle East by Mark Katz, brings us into the modern era by providing a sort of more descriptive update of Russian objectives and tools for achieving these objectives in MENA. Katz describes Russia as having four objectives in regard to MENA: leveraging MENA nation’s unhappiness with Western powers, preventing the rise of Sunni extremism (in the fear that it could spill over into Russia), keeping the price and flow of oil stable (in part to ensure European nations stay reliant on Russia for their oil), and finally to expand Moscow’s “exports of arms, nuclear reactors, and other goods produced by enterprises closely linked to the Kremlin” (Katz 2). Katz then describes how Russian policy in the region underwent a transformation thanks to the Arab Spring; gone was the “pursui[t of] good relations with all governments and certain key political movements in the MENA” (Katz 2). Russia transitioned to strong support for Assad and his regime by blocking movements against the Assad Regime at the UN Security Council, supplying arms to the regime, and working with other MENA nations that similarly oppose Assad’s downfall. However, there are several limiting factors working against Russia’s efforts in the region. In addition to the fact that the four objectives mentioned above can conflict with each other, Russia is hesitant to again use significant military power in the region, and its arm sales and other forms of trade in the region buy little in the way of influence. Unfortunately, this combined with the fact that Russia is attempting to play all sides in MENA (for example, buying military technology from Israel while working closely with enemies of Israel) means that certain states are more hesitant about dealing with Russia and thus their influence in the region is limited.
My main critique of Katz’s article concerns his discussion of the limited means that Russia has available to influence the region. In particular, his claim that Putin is unwilling to utilize military resources in the region strikes me as short-sighted. While it may have been true at the time of this article’s publication, it has been proven all too false as Putin has deployed a variety of forces into the region, especially into Syria. These forces have even been involved in battles with US troops, though both the US and Russian governments have attempted to conceal this fact. Putin’s willingness to deploy military force (often covertly) in and around Russia has never been in contention, and it was unwise for Katz to assume that this would not eventually translate over into MENA.
The third article, The New Power Couple: Russia and Iran in the Middle East by Ellie Geranmayeh and Kadri Liik takes us away from the broader structural analysis provided by the two previous articles in favor of a more detailed analysis of the relationship between Iran and Russia currently. The article asserts that the war in Syria has enabled a greater degree of cooperation between Russia and Iran. There are certain broader similarities between the two nations; both favor a more multi-polar world in which they will have more prominence (Iran is more regionally focused and Russia more globally focused), both oppose Western-led regime change and Western military operations in the Middle East, and both want to preserve the Assad regime in Syria (Iran partly because Syria serves as an important supply highway for Hezbollah and Russia to maintain influence in the region and leverage its position in Syria to engage with the West). However, there are some significant differences between them, including: Iran is more committed to Assad personally remaining in power for longer, Iran favors a more military approach to this problem while Russia has entertained the idea of diplomatic solutions, and Russia is more wary about the existence of non-state actors such as paramilitary militia groups in Syria. Russia and Iran also view each other in very different ways. Russia sees Iran as more as a tool among many in its toolbox to achieve its objectives in the region, especially in regards to Russia’s relations with the West. Because of this, they are unlikely to support Iran in extreme anti-Western operations and will still want to preserve relations with other nations in the MENA such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Iran is more divided on how to view their relationship with Russia, with the leadership being divided into three main camps: “Russia-leaners” (who want a more intensive and structured relationship with Moscow), “Re-balancers” (who are more wary of Russia and want more international diplomatic and economic engagement), and those who favor the “Middle Way” (who want to orient towards Russia while not ignoring opportunities for engagement with the West). Because of these factors, the authors believe that while short-term intense cooperation in Syria is likely, long-term cooperation to the same degree is unlikely.
I found this article to be extremely well-researched and convincing, and so my only criticism is not so much a criticism of their findings or conclusions but rather what they seem to have omitted. There is little discussion of the role of the United States in regards to Iran’s policy options, as the relationship with Iran has soured so extremely in recent times it is difficult to reconcile recent events with the conclusions the authors draw based on their analysis of the Iranian’s leadership’s policy positions.
The fourth article, Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, is the most recent of the four articles (it was published on 11 October 2019) and so provides one of the most timely analyses of the current situation in Syria. While a good portion of the article is devoted to an analysis of ISIS in Iraq, I have omitted it from this work for the purposes of relevance and brevity. In regards to Syria, the authors make it clear that the Turkish incursion into Syria is the most pressing matter in relation to a possible ISIS resurgence. Turkish resolve to militarily engage the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) led by the Kurdish YPG has the possibility to allow for a resurgent ISIS in Syria. Turkey considers the Kurdish YPG (closely related to the terrorist-designated PKK) to be terrorists and as worthy (if not more so) of destruction than ISIS. Unfortunately, the SDF were responsible for liberating massive swaths of Syrian territory from ISIS, and currently manage numerous prisons for captured ISIS fighters, refugee camps for displaced persons, and are still engaged in counter-ISIS operations. A major Turkish incursion would force the SDF to divert forces away from their fight against ISIS, and allow ISIS much more freedom to mobilize and rebuild in what is currently their main theatre of insurgent operations.
My main critique of this article is that little attention is devoted to the potential spillover effects of a possible ISIS resurgence in either Iraq or Syria on the other nation. While it is mentioned briefly, both nations (Syria more than Iraq) are currently in precarious political and military situations and the effects of an ISIS resurgence at this critical period would be disastrous on both nations and would likely affect the rest of the entire region, if not the world.