U.S. Foreign Policy Options for Constraining Turkey in Syria
An Analysis of Potential Non-Military Foreign Policy Options to Respond to Turkey's Actions in Syria
The following is an essay I wrote for an introductory Political Science class I took at Duke University in 2019. The opinions expressed here should not be taken as my own but rather as a critical evaluation of an issue in response to a specific prompt.
U.S. OPTIONS FOR CONSTRAINING TURKEY IN SYRIA
With the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria, it has become increasingly difficult for the U.S. to exert influence in the region. This was confirmed by the immediate incursion of Turkish forces into Northern Syria and their subsequent fight against the Kurds in that area. Although difficult, I believe it is possible for the U.S. to still exert influence in the region and constrain Turkey’s actions in Northern Syria by utilizing certain American non-military foreign policy tools coupled with cooperation from a few key international regimes. The U.S. and international partners can attempt to do so by working towards the following objectives: fomenting political instability within Turkey by reducing/eliminating options and support for the resettlement of Turkey’s sizeable Syrian refugee population, damaging Turkey’s economy through broad economic sanctions, and by establishing a peacekeeping mission from the UN or NATO. I will begin my argument by performing a brief overview of the conceptual dimensions of U.S. non-military foreign policy tools and international regimes before then providing an overview of previous efforts to constrain Turkey’s behavior and how these efforts have fared. I will then outline, explain, and address potential obstacles to each of my three options for constraining Turkey’s behavior in Northern Syria.
The U.S. has a plethora of non-military foreign policy tools available for use, ranging from soft power tools such as the desirability of American culture to more extreme hard power tools like economic sanctions. These tools can be broadly summed up in the following three categories: diplomacy, military power, and economic power. Due to U.S. reluctance to exert military force in Syria (evidenced by President Trump’s decision to withdraw American forces from the region), only tools that fall under the categories of diplomacy and economic power will be discussed. In addition to the U.S.’ own foreign policy tools, it can work with/through a variety of international regimes to achieve its foreign policy goals. International regimes can also be classified into three broad categories based on the level of explicit cooperation and direction required for them to operate: implicit regimes (those that operate without directed cooperation), medium regimes (those that rely on international consensus), and explicit regimes (those that require a high degree of supranational direction and a fair amount of cooperation across state actors, such as the UN, the EU, or NATO) . Due to Turkey’s belligerence in the region, I deem explicit regimes as the only ones capable of coordinating and operating effectively in opposition and so will be the only regime type discussed. A few of these tools and regimes have been utilized in an effort to constrain Turkey’s recent behavior in Northern Syria, with varying degrees of success. The U.S. raised tariffs on Turkish steel up to 50% and implemented a series of sanctions against two Turkish government ministries, but these actions were widely viewed as ineffective until their cancellation after the Turkish cease-fire (Associated Press). The EU issued a condemnation of Turkey’s actions and its member nations pledged to suspend weapons exports to Turkey, while NATO stopped short of a formal condemnation and merely issued a warning to Ankara (Barigazzi; Stolton). However, it is unlikely that the EU will be able to pursue any meaningful actions to constrain Turkey, as President Erdogan has pledged that “any condemnation from Europe would result in his, ‘opening the gates and send[ing] 3.6 million refugees [to Europe]’” (Prothero). NATO’s warning carries no official penalty or punishment behind it and so is similarly toothless. The only two actions that may have had some effect were the negotiations between U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Turkish officials and the agreement reached between Russia and Turkey to jointly police the Syrian border zone. However, it is extremely difficult to know to what extent or even if these actions had any impact on Turkey’s decision to cease their military operations, as the leadership of both countries have claimed credit for the cease-fire (Crowley and Jakes). I propose that there are three options that the U.S. and international partners can pursue that would likely be more effective in constraining Turkey’s actions in Northern Syria.
The first option available for dealing with Turkey, referred to here as Option A, concerns Turkey’s Syrian refugee crisis. The Syrian civil war has forced a record number of Syrian refugees into neighboring Turkey; this number has been counted at 3.6 million but is estimated to be at least 4 million (Makovsky). Because the majority of the Turkish population holds negative views of the refugees (83% of Turkish citizens), is increasingly critical of the government’s policy to let them into Turkey (72% of Turkish citizens), and strongly opposes any efforts towards integration of these refugees into Turkish society (nearly 80% of Turkish citizens want the refugees to return to Syria), Ankara has accordingly stated that its official policy is to resettle all of the refugees somewhere other than Turkey (Makovsky). The U.S. and its international partners can utilize the opportunity presented by the presence of these refugees and their unpopularity in Turkey to attempt to constrain Turkey’s actions in Northern Syria. First, the U.S. must eliminate (or at least significantly reduce) humanitarian aid to Turkey meant to help Turkey’s massive refugee population. Secondly, the U.S. must convince EU members to cancel the EU-Turkey migration deal (which provided billions of dollars in aid to Turkey and codified a process by which certain refugees could enter Europe), refuse to take in any more Turkish refugees, and cancel any aid going to Turkey for the purpose of helping Turkey’s refugees (Long). If this can be achieved, it is likely that the vast majority of Turkey’s Syrian refugee population will continue to remain in Turkey, causing significant political problems for the government. The largest potential obstacle would be convincing the EU to go along with this plan due to Erdogan’s aforementioned threat to push the refugees into Europe. In order to convince the EU that they will be protected from this threat, it would be prudent to take the U.S. aid meant for Turkey and send it to EU member countries (most notably countries that are significant gateways for refugees from Turkey, like Greece) for the purposes of border defense. In addition, the EU can take the funds they too had earmarked for Turkey and apply it to their border defenses, thus allowing them to achieve three goals: a reduction in the amount of refugees coming into Europe, a condemnation of Turkey’s actions in Northern Syria, and protection against the threat of Turkish Syrian refugees flooding Europe.
The second option, referred to as Option B, calls for broad economic sanctions levied against Turkey by the U.S. and other international partners. Turkey’s largest trading partners in terms of exports are Germany, the UK, the UAE, Iraq, and the U.S.; Germany and the UK are close allies of the U.S. and if convinced to join with the U.S. in implementing serious sanctions against Turkey it is likely that these sanctions will have a significant negative impact on the Turkish economy. It would likely be easier to convince individual nations such as the UK and Germany to join with the U.S. rather than the entire EU or the UN as sanctions from the EU would require unanimous consent from all members and sanctions from the UN would require all permanent members of the Security Council to approve it (unlikely, due to Russia’s refusal to condemn Turkey’s actions) (Masters). A potential obstacle to implementing this option would be convincing Germany and the UK to join with the U.S. in levying sanctions and the actual efficacy of the sanctions themselves. However, if Option B is implemented in tandem with Option A (thus assuaging the threat of more Turkish Syrian refugees flooding into Europe), it will likely be easier to convince the UK and especially Germany (who already has a sizeable refugee population) to go along with this option. A possible downside to this plan is that sanctions are not always effective, and sometimes can even result in the strengthening of a ruler or undesirable segment of society (Feaver and Lorber 12). Again however, if they are part of a series of options (as in combined with Option A), it is likely they can have a more significant impact than if the U.S. were to only levy sanctions.
The third option, referred to as Option C, involves coordination with two of the largest and most influential international regimes, the UN and NATO. The goal of this option is to have some form of peacekeeping forces deployed to Northern Syria to help enforce the cease-fire, prevent further attacks on the Kurds (especially the civilians), and to prevent a resurgence of ISIS. This option would likely be the hardest to implement, as it would require a consensus of member nations (in the UN, the approval of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council). It is possible that some sort of UN peacekeeping resolution deploying forces to Northern Syria could get voted through if it is framed as a mission aimed at the containment of and prevention of the resurgence of ISIS. It must be framed this way to gain the vote of Russia, who has indicated they will not accept any condemnation of Turkish actions in Northern Syria but that they are concerned about the resurgence of ISIS; President Vladimir Putin even went as far as to say that a resurgence of ISIS would be a “real threat for all of us” (Stolton). However, if Russia vetoes any form of UN peacekeeping forces deployment to the region, it is possible to still have some sort of international coalition deployed to the region through NATO. While President Trump has demonstrated a decreasing desire for participation in NATO and a strong aversion to more troop deployments to the Middle East, other member countries could possibly be convinced to form some sort of rudimentary coalition to join with Turkish forces in the region. This could be framed as both a mission aimed at containing ISIS as well as one in support of Turkish actions in the region, which could convince Turkey to allow NATO partner forces to join them in the region. This could be done without actually formally condoning or providing support for Turkish military actions in Northern Syria against the Kurds, but would be informally framed as such in order to win Turkish support. If this could be achieved, partner forces on the ground in Northern Syria could then actively work to counter any possible resurgence by ISIS and act as a check on Turkish military actions against the Kurds while weakening Turkey’s cooperation with Russia vis a vis it’s joint efforts with other NATO member nations.
Taken together, these three options offer a punitive approach towards Turkey that nonetheless allows for greater coordination and hopefully, future reconciliation with Ankara.
Works Cited
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Crowley, Michael, and Lara Jakes. “Trump Claims Credit for a Syria Cease-Fire and Says U.S. Role in Region Is Over.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 23 Oct. 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/us/politics/trump-syria-turkey-ceasefire.html?module=inline.
“The EU-Turkey Deal: Explained.” Help Refugees, 14 Mar. 2019, helprefugees.org/news/eu-turkey-deal-explained/.
Feaver, Peter, and Eric Lorber. “Coercive Diplomacy and the New Financial Levers: Evaluating the Intended and Unintended Consequences of Financial Sanctions.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1661963.
Makovsky, Alan. “Turkey's Refugee Dilemma.” Center for American Progress, www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/03/13/467183/turkeys-refugee-dilemma/.
Nye, Joseph S. “Soft Power.” Foreign Policy, no. 80, 1990, p. 153., doi:10.2307/1148580.
Press, Associated. “Trump Says Turkey Will Make 5-Day Cease-Fire 'Permanent'.” Time, Time, 24 Oct. 2019, time.com/5708570/turkey-permanent-cease-fire-syria/.
Prothero, Mitch. “Turkey's Plan to Flood Europe with Millions of Refugees Is a Real and Dangerous Threat, Officials Warn.” Business Insider, Business Insider, 11 Oct. 2019, www.businessinsider.com/turkey-threat-to-send-millions-refugees-to-eu-real-officials-2019-10.
Stolton, Samuel. “Turkey's Relationship with NATO Tested over Syria Operation.” Turkey-Syria Border | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 14 Oct. 2019, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/turkey-relationship-nato-tested-syria-operation-191013190857028.html.
“What Are Economic Sanctions?” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions.